| Demystifying the CGL Policy
By Britton D. Weimer
The Commercial General Liability policy
is used by virtually every Minnesota business that can afford insurance.
Yet the policy is a mystery to many Minnesota attorneys.
Lawyers want to understand this important policy. Whether we represent
insurers or businesses, we need to discuss CGL coverages with our clients.
However, at first glance, the policy looks hopelessly complex. The current
version of the CGL has 16 single-spaced pages, not including endorsements
and declarations pages. Fortunately, the main concepts of the policy
are readily understood.
The CGL policy is essentially a fusion of three different business policies.
The first, "Coverage A," provides liability insurance1
for accidental bodily injury and property damage. The second, "Coverage
B," provides liability insurance for specific personal-injury and
advertising-injury torts. The third, "Coverage C," is first-party
insurance for medical expenses. This article provides a general overview
of all three, under the most recent (2001) CGL policy, under Minnesota
law.2
COVERAGE A
Coverage A provides broad liability insurance for an "occurrence"
producing either "bodily injury" or "property damage."
This broad coverage is subject to many exclusions.
Occurrence. An "occurrence" is an "accident."
It is an "unexpected, unforeseen or undesigned happening or consequence."3
The focus is on accidental injury, not accident conduct. All conduct
is on some level intentional. If intentional conduct produces an accidental
injury, there is an occurrence. If intentional conduct produces intentional
injury, though, there is no occurrence.4
In some inherent-damage cases, the courts will impute intent to injure
as a matter of law. Thus, in Franklin v. Western National Mutual Ins.
Co.,5 the Supreme Court denied coverage for a
trespass. There was no occurrence, because the resulting damage was
"highly predictable."
Bodily Injury. "Bodily injury" covers claims for physical
harm to the body, including sickness or disease. This can include the
physical effects of unwanted touching or battery, such as in a sexual
harassment case.6
Coverage will extend to emotional distress, if the emotional distress
produces "appreciable physical manifestations."7
However, there is no coverage for pure emotional distress.8
Property Damage. "Property damage" covers (1) injury
to tangible property, or (2) loss of use of tangible property.
"Tangible property" includes real property. Thus, there can
be coverage for pollution damage to neighboring land, if the pollution
exclusion does not apply.9
There is no coverage for purely intangible property. Although "intangible
property" has not been clearly defined by Minnesota insurance case
law, it probably includes four categories of property: intellectual
property (copyrights, trademarks, etc.); documents representing value
(stock, promissory notes, etc.); intangible rights (good will and reputation);
and economic interests (profits, productivity, etc.).10
There can be coverage for mixed tangible/intangible claims. For example,
coverage extends to loss of data, if the data was destroyed along with
the tangible storage medium. Thus, in Retail Systems, Inc. v. CNA Ins.
Co.,11 when computer tape was destroyed, there
was coverage both for the damaged tape and for the loss of data on the
tape.12
"Loss of use" includes loss of access to the property. For
example, it includes having to move out of a building, or deprival of
use of a building due to defects and repairs.13
Exclusions. The broad Coverage A insurance is subject to many
exclusions. In general, these fall into two categories.
First, there are exclusions which correspond to other common liability
policies. These can include the workers compensation exclusion (workers
compensation policies), the employment-related practices exclusion (employment
practices liability policies), the motor vehicle exclusion (automobile
policies), and the professional services exclusion (malpractice and
errors and omissions policies).
Second, there are exclusions for extraordinary risks -- extraordinary
either because of their large size or because they are within the insured's
control. These include the contractual liability exclusion, the pollution
exclusion, the work-product exclusion, and the assault and battery exclusion.
COVERAGE B
As previously noted, Coverages B and A are analytically distinct. Coverage
A is for tangible damages; Coverage B is primarily for intangible damages.
Coverage A is a broad-based insurance, triggered by almost any form
of negligence; Coverage B is limited to specific enumerated torts. Coverage
A has many exclusions; Coverage B has few exclusions.
The Court of Appeals made similar distinctions in Hamlin v. Western
National Mutual Ins. Co.,14 focusing in particular
on personal injury coverage. Personal injury coverage is narrower than
Coverage A because it is limited expressly to damages arising out of
"a variety of listed torts."15 However,
it is also broader than Coverage A, because it can include "an
affront to one's reputation, such as defamation."16
In the 2001 policy, there are seven "personal and advertising injury"
torts:
1. False arrest, detention or imprisonment;
2. Malicious prosecution;
3. The wrongful eviction from, wrongful entry into, or invasion of
the right of private occupancy of a room, dwelling or premises that
a person occupies, committed by or on behalf of its owner, landlord
or lessor;
4. Oral or written publication of material that slanders or libels
a person or organization or disparages a person's or organizations'
goods, products or services;
5. Oral or written publication of material that violates a person's
right of privacy;
6. The use of another's advertising idea in your "advertisement";
7. Infringing upon another's copyright, trade dress or slogan in your
"advertisement".
Each of the seven is briefly examined below.
False Arrest, Detention or Imprisonment. These coverages are
primarily for claims against police, private security services, and
businesses employing security guards. Covered claims can include statutory
civil rights actions against police and common-law claims for false
arrest and detention.
Malicious Prosecution. Malicious prosecution is a companion coverage
to false arrest, detention or imprisonment. Both cover claims that the
insured abused the legal system. However, malicious prosecution concerns
litigation, not imprisonment.
Malicious prosecution requires that the underlying suit be groundless.17
Thus, the coverage is not as broad as the tort of "abuse
of process," which includes meritorious but harassing litigation.18
Wrongful Entry, Eviction or Invasion of Private Occupancy. These
coverages are used most often in tenant claims against landlords for
trespass and wrongful-eviction.
In Garvis v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co.,19
the Supreme Court discussed the scope of "wrongful entry."
In some respects, it is narrower than the tort of trespass: trespass
encompasses "any unlawful interference with one's person, property
or rights," while wrongful entry is the insured's "invasion
of an interest in real property."20 In other
respects, the coverage is broader than the tort of trespass: wrongful
entry includes unintentional conduct, while trespass often must be intentional.21
In contrast to wrongful entry, "invasion of the right of private
occupancy" does not require physical entry onto the property. Constructive
entry is sufficient.22
Libel, Slander and Disparagement. Coverage for libel and slander
is basically the same as for common-law defamation. Thus, in Meadowbrook
v. Tower Insurance Co.,23 Tower Insurance Company
did not deny coverage for the defamation count in a sexual harassment
lawsuit.
Sales efforts that falsely disparage a competitor or a competitor's
product can trigger coverage. For example, there is coverage for claims
that the insured made false statements about the plaintiffs and their
products to their licensees and prospective licensees.24
Coverage is excluded for defamation when the insured has "knowledge
of its falsity." Although this normally requires an express allegation
of knowledge in the underlying complaint, the 8th Circuit has held that
knowledge can be implied when logically necessary to the underlying
claim.25
Publication Violating Privacy. Minnesota recently recognized
three categories of tort for invasion of privacy: intrusion upon seclusion,
appropriation, and publication of private facts.26
A tort in the third privacy category, "publication of private facts,"
occurs when the defendant publicizes private information that is "highly
offensive" and "not of legitimate concern to the public."27
Insureds sued for invasion of privacy, especially torts in the third
category, will be invoking this CGL policy coverage.
Privacy coverage is similar to the coverage for defamation. Both concern
the publication of harmful information. The main difference: defamation
coverage is limited to false statements, while privacy coverage extends
to accurate information.
There is no coverage for invasion of privacy unless the private information
is "published." Thus, there will be no coverage for offensive
remarks made privately to the plaintiff.
Theft of Advertising Ideas. This covers most claims for theft
of a competitor's advertising strategies and concepts. It is the taking
of "another's manner of advertising."28
Infringement of Copyright, Trade Dress or Slogan. This coverage
is not as broad as it first appears. It does not cover all intellectual
property claims. In particular, there is generally no coverage for patent
infringement. For example, in Flouroware v. Chubb Group of Ins. Cos.,29
the insured alleged sought "trade dress" coverage for
a patent-infringement claim. Trade dress is the total image of a product
or business, and "may include features such as size, shape, color
or color combinations, texture, graphics, or even particular sales techniques."30
However, coverage requires proof of a "likelihood of confusion."31
In Flouroware, because there was no claim of confusion by consumers
in distinguishing between the two companies' packages, there was no
trade-dress coverage.
This coverage does not extend to all infringement in the course of the
insured's business. Instead, the infringement must occur in the insured's
"advertisement." Coverage is limited to "injuries from
advertising rather than injuries arising out of other activities that
coincidentally were advertised."32
COVERAGE C
Unlike Coverages A and B, which provide liability insurance, Coverage
C provides first-party indemnity insurance. Specifically, this coverage
provides medical payments for nonemployees injured on the business premises
or at off-premises business operations. Coverage applies whether or
not the insured was at fault.33
The coverage is subject to eight exclusions, which are essentially a
simplified version of the standard Coverage A and Coverage B exclusions.
Although medical-payments coverage is not liability insurance, its inclusion
in the CGL policy is not as arbitrary as it first appears. The coverage
is promptly payable, regardless of fault. Thus, it can avoid a costlier
lawsuit against the insured business.
CONCLUSION
With careful study, the mystery surrounding the CGL policy largely
evaporates. A lawsuit for accidental bodily injury or property damage
may be insured under Coverage A. A lawsuit for intangible torts may
be insured under Coverage B. A premises claim for medical payments may
be insured under Coverage C.
NOTES
1. Liability insurance, also called third-party insurance, covers
lawsuits against the insured. It pays the insured's attorneys fees and
other defense costs, plus indemnifies the insured for a judgment or
settlement. By contrast, first-party insurance covers the insured's
non-litigation losses.
2. For a more detailed analysis, see Chapter 5 of 22 Weimer, Hagglund
and Whitman, Minnesota Practice: Insurance Law and Practice (West 2001).
3. Hauenstein v. St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co., 65 N.W.2d 122, 126
(Minn. 1954).
4. American Family Ins. Co. v. Walser, 628 N.W.2d 605, 611 (Minn. 2001).
5. 574 N.W.2d 405, 408 (Minn. 1998).
6. Meadowbrook v. Tower Ins. Co., 559 N.W.2d 411, 419 (Minn. 1997).
7. Garvis v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 497 N.W.2d 254, 257 (Minn. 1993).
8. Hamlin v. Western National Mutual Ins. Co., 461 N.W.2d 395, 397 (Minn.
App. 1990).
9. See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 457
N.W.2d 175 (Minn. 1990).
10. See Note, "Liability Coverage for "Damages Because of
Property Damage" under the Comprehensive General Liability Policy,"
68 Minn. L. Rev. 795, 802-03 (1984).
11. 469 N.W.2d 735 (Minn. App. 1991).
12. The 2001 CGL policy changed the definition of "tangible property,"
expressly stating that it excludes electronic data. This clarification
appears consistent with the rationale of Retail Systems.
13. See Grinnell Mutual Reins. Co. v. Wasmuth, 432 N.W.2d 495, 500-01
(Minn. App. 1988); Board of Regents v. Royal Ins. Co., 517 N.W.2d 888
(Minn. 1994); Hauenstein v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 65 N.W.2d 122,
125 (Minn. 1954).
14. 461 N.W.2d 395 (Minn. App. 1990).
15. Id. at 398.
16. Id. n.2.
17. See Williamson v. Guentzel, 584 N.W.2d 20, 23 (Minn. App. 1998).
18. Pow-Bel Constr. Corp. v. Gondek, 192 N.W.2d 812, 814 (Minn. 1972).
19. 497 N.W.2d 254 (Minn. 1993).
20. Id. at 259, citing Cincinnati Ins. Cos. v. Davis, 265 S.E.2d 102,
105 (Ga. App. 1980).
21. Id.
22. Id., citing Titan Holdings Syndicate v. City of Keene, 898 F.2d
265 (1st Cir. 1990); Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. City of Palmyra,
650 F. Supp. 981 (E.D. Mo. 1987).
23. 559 N.W.2d 411 (Minn. 1997).
24. Home Ins. Co. v. Waycrosse, 990 F. Supp. 720, 729-30 (D. Minn. 1996),
aff'd 131 F.3d 143 (8th Cir. 1997).
25. See Callas Enterprises, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co. of America,
193 F.3d 952, 957 n.5 (8th Cir. 1999) (Minnesota law).
26. See Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 233-35 (Minn.
1998).
27. Id., quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts ¤ 652D.
28. Flouroware v. Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 545 N.W.2d 678, 682 (Minn.
App. 1996), citing J.A. Brundage Plumbing & Roto-Rooter, Inc. v.
Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co., 818 F. Supp. 553, 557 (W.D.N.Y. 1993), vacated
on other grounds, 153 F.R.D. 36 (W.D.N.Y. 1994); Merchants Co. v. American
Motorists Ins. Co., 794 F. Supp. 611, 619 (S.D. Miss. 1992).
29. 545 N.W.2d 678 (Minn. App. 1996).
30. Id. at 683, quoting Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S.
Ct. 2753, 2755 n.1 (1992).
31. Id.
32. Polaris Indus. v. Continental Ins. Co., 539 N.W.2d 619, 622 (Minn.
App. 1995), citing Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 833 P.2d 545,
559-60 (Cal. 1992).
33. Medical, Inc. v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 566 N.W.2d 74, 77-79 (Minn.
1997).
BRITTON WEIMER is a partner with Hagglund, Weimer &
Speidel. His practice emphasizes insurance coverage and insurance defense,
trial and appellate. He coauthored Volume 22 of West's Minnesota Practice
series, Insurance Law and Practice.
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